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ABSTRACT. This essay claims that the rejection of Lukács’s realism is quite problematic, in the 
sense that his opponents such as Adorno and Althusser symbolically used the name of Lukács and 
perpetuated the suspicion of Lukács’s compromise with Stalinism. The essay argues that Lukács’s 
model of reflection is not couched in Stalin’s socialist realism, a theory that assumes the 
transparency between aesthetic forms and reality, but rather raises the essential problems of the 
condition of writers in capitalist society. Lukács’s realism aims at providing a practical strategy to 
overcome cultural reification, focusing on the mediation between an author and his material 
condition. An investigation of Lukács’s realism reveals that Lukács’s way of understanding realism 
arises from his emphasis on objectivity rather than subjective reflection such as Kantian philosophy. 
The essay claims that this is the kernel of Lukácsean reflection theory signified by an aesthetic of 
realism definitively opposed to Stalin’s socialist realism. From this perspective, the essay takes 
Althusserian Marxism as the occasion to stage a wide consideration of anti-realism. It proposes to 
elucidate the implicit assumptions behind the decline of Lukács’s realism, and the reification of 
cultural fields that gradually came to dominate Western literary apparatuses. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Lukács’s defense of realism as a literary mode was one of the most controversial features of 
his aesthetics in the sense that it precipitated the conflict with other Marxist theorists of his time. 
Today, Lukács’s defense of realism is often misunderstood as an obsolete edifice after the advent of 
Western Marxism and Althusserian Marxism. 
From this perspective, Lukács regards artistic form as “self-containment” in which the totality of 
the form is more intensively structured than material reality. That is to say, the Lukácsean concept 
of reflection is not the Kantian correspondence between consciousness and reality, but rather 
reflection in proper proportion as in a geographical map. In this respect, Lukács’s formulation of 
realism is a method of mapping out the capitalist social reality beyond fragmentation and 
reification. 
 
2. QUESTIONS FOR LUKÁCS’S REFLECTION THEORY 
Despite the prejudice that his argument is a mere reflection theory, what Lukács’s realism 
proposes is quite equivocal. At first sight, Lukács’s realism seems to suggest a better method to 
copy reality, yet, paradoxically, his realism implies another meaning at the level of the practical 
message. As Galin Tihanov argues, "Lukács’s understanding of realism lies in the way in which he 
conceptualizes method as the expression of Weltanschauung" ( p. 108). There is no doubt that 
Lukács’s formulation of method is partly influenced by the neo-Kantian conceptualization of the 
relationship between an individual artwork and Weltanschauung. Lukács confesses that Georg 
Simmel, a philosopher of Lebensphilosophie, gave him the idea of the social character of art. 
Yet Lukács also maintains that Simmel’s influence was nothing less than “a basis for the discussion 
of literature that went well beyond Simmel’s own.”For this reason, it seems that it is not the 
transcendental category of Weltanschauung in neo-Kantian aesthetic that is crucial to Lukács’s 
formulation of realism, but rather the subject-object dialectic, responding to both Hegelianism and 
neo-Kantianism. 
According to Tihanov, for the early Lukács, who attempted to reformulate the neo- Kantian 
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idea of aesthetics, “embracing Hegel for the purpose of establishing a systematic aesthetics involves 
a compromise between historical and a priori category”(p. 42). 
In other words, Lukács endorses the Hegelian category of mediation to substantiate the neo-
Kantian conception, adapting the teleological view of totality. In this way, Lukács’s idea of realism 
is inseparable from his early philosophical presupposition of form, which was developed in 
Heidelberg Aesthetics (1916–1918).Lukács’s doctrine of realism contains the tension between “the 
Hegelian postulate of the unity of content and form and the neo-Kantian prejudice that only form 
can upgrade content to essentiality.” This is the very principle whereby Lukács regards realism as 
“a perennial trend in literature . . . and a specific, historically determined mode of literary 
production.” For Lukács, Weltanschauung is not a priori about artistic creation, but rather the mode 
of narrative produced by the mediation between an author and his circumstance. This is the reason 
why, as Tihanov acknowledges, “Lukács’s category of method seems more plausible and 
seamlessly attachable to his discussions of particular schools and movements.”(p. 107). That is to 
say, Lukács’s conception of method, pertaining to the category of Weltanschauung can be properly 
applied for the periodisation of aesthetic ideologies. 
From this perspective, Lukács attempts to draw a distinction between the description of 
naturalism and the narration of realism. It should be noted that Lukács considers naturalism as 
“modern realism,” the mode of realism without mediation between subject and object. Lukács’s 
scathing criticism of the descriptive method in modern realism explicitly challenges the view that 
such a technique adequately mirrors the inhumanity of capitalism. Lukács does not admit the 
position that defends a descriptive method as more realistic, but rather reproaches the writers who 
employ description to dilute the essential capitalist reality. Along with this criticism, Lukács 
deplores “modern realism” for making the novel lose “its capacity to depict the dynamics of life, 
and thus its representation of capitalist reality is inadequate, diluted and constrained.”For Lukács, 
“modern realism” designates naturalism and, in Jameson’s terms, the coded language of socialist 
realism. In addition, Lukács himself explicitly defined Stalin’s socialist realism as socialist 
naturalism. Lukács also criticized the way in which Stalin’s socialist realism simply combines 
political dogmatism with factum brutum without mediation; it represents a configuration of 
objectivity that is nothing less than inverse subjectivity: Stalinist dogmatism as naturalism. As 
Fredric Jameson observes, “the concept of mediation has traditionally been the way in which 
dialectical philosophy and Marxism itself have formulated their vocation to break out of the 
specialized compartments of the (bourgeois) disciplines and to make connections among the 
seemingly disparate phenomena of social life generally” (p. 40). The category of mediation is the 
way in which we actually grasp the heterogeneous relationships between the individual phenomena, 
which appear to be part of abstract homogeneity. Accordingly, mediation does not so much 
presuppose the conceptual antagonistic dichotomy, identity versus identity, but rather the prereified 
concrete relationship of particularity as such. In short, identity is not fully constituted in mediation. 
Hegel argues that mediation is “a conscious Being [the mediator], for it is an action which mediates 
consciousness as such; the content of this action is the extinction of its particular individuality 
which consciousness is undertaking” (p. 136). 
A significant philosophical factor in the Hegelian formulation lies in the conceptualization of 
the mediator as an “action” resisting “consciousness” in which all difference is sublimated. 
Needless to say, Hegel believes in the final triumph of consciousness over the action. Even though 
Marx arguably draws on enlightenment strategies such as “de-mystification,” more significantly, he 
seems to indirectly highlight the concept of mediation as an action in his discussion of Hegel. 
Obviously focusing on this principle in his explanation of Lukács’s theoretical originality, 
Jameson argues that “the privileged relationship to reality, the privileged mode of knowledge 
of the world will no longer be a static, contemplative one, will no longer be one of pure reason or 
abstract thought, but will be the union of thought and action that the Marxists call praxis, will be 
one of activity conscious of itself”(p. 188). 
Putting an emphasis on mediation, Lukács distinguished his realism from “mirroring realism.” 
Lukács plainly argues that writers should take the opportunity to reach a higher aesthetic level by 
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means of realism rather than symbolism. In Lukács’s view, therefore, symbolism is a mirror in 
which writers’ subjectivity, not external objectivity, reflects itself. Lukács designates this non-
aesthetic aspect as “mannerism,” in the sense that this reflection comes to produce repetitively a 
mirror image as it works. It is in this way that the problem of Lukács’s realism does not arise out of 
his reflection theory, but rather its pedagogical purpose out of providing a user’s guide to 
revolutionary literature. 
In spite of the practical aspect of Lukács’s realism, the theory of reflection is still the most 
suspicious element in Lukács’s defence of realism. In particular, Adorno insists that Lukács simply 
considers the formal and stylistic aspects of an artwork to be reactionary decadence. Adorno’s 
argument is that form is “self-antagonistic and refracted, through which each and every successful 
work separates itself from the merely existing” (p. 142). In short, Adorno’s defence of form 
presupposes the autonomy of the artwork distinguished from reality – the artwork obtains its 
autonomous totality by rejecting realism. Adorno’s anti-realist aesthetics has influenced both the 
defenders of Lukács as well as his opponents. 
Despite their sympathetic reception of Lukács, for instance, Jameson and Michael Löwy are 
not interested in his formulation of reflection theory. Their focuses are on the early Lukács of 
History and Class Consciousness where he explicitly formulates his theory against the Kantian 
concept of reflection. What offers a philosophical ground for the Lukácsean formulation of realism 
is that form is a specific spatiality in which the temporality of reality has been fixed. For Lukács, 
therefore, form is a spatialisation of time in which the logic of content is structured by mediation 
between author and reality. In Lukács’s terms, that is to say, “content” does not so much designate a 
monadic unity of reality as heterogeneous reality itself – one form does not have one content but 
many contents. This Lukácsean concept of content is incisively drawn from the way in which 
Lukács understands reality as the total sum of events. 
The issue that Lukács seriously raises in this formulation of realism arises from his 
disenchantment with Kantian transcendental aesthetics, in which Kant presupposes space and time 
as a priori epistemological conditions. For Kant, space and time do not belong to experience but 
rather to the a priori condition of experience, in the sense that every experience is constituted within 
a specific combination of spatiality and temporality. In this respect, Kant regards time and space as 
“two sources of knowledge, from which bodies of a priori synthetic knowledge can be derived” (p. 
80). In other words, time and space as the pure form of all intuition make a priori synthetic 
knowledge possible. However, Lukács refutes this Kantian proposition of time and space as a priori 
conditions of knowledge. Lukács presumes that time is not a homogenous medium, in the sense that 
the world is not constituted by a conglomerate of individual things but by a complex of events. 
Largely endorsing the Hegelian dialectic, Lukács understands reality as combinations of essence 
and appearance – crucially for Lukács these categories of essence and appearance are not merely 
by-products of consciousness but the effects of the outer world. No doubt, this is where Lukács 
reverses the Kantian idea of representation. 
Explicitly distinguishing reality from fact, Lukács defines reality as the changeability 
everlasting of essence and appearance. From this perspective, the Lukácsean category of totality 
comes to exist in its own right – “the category of totality . . . determines not only the object of 
knowledge but also the subject.”In other words, the subject of totality means the classes in capitalist 
society. Therefore, Lukács definitely designates the collective subjectivity of classes when he 
mentions the dialectical relationship between subject and object. 
More controversially, what Lukács apparently rejected in History and Class Consciousness 
was the very Kantian concept of reflection; Lukács’s realism seems to betray his early theoretical 
principle of non-reflection theory. Lukács criticized the Kantian concept of reflection because in 
this formulation “we find the theoretical embodiment of the duality of thought and existence, 
consciousness and reality” (p. 200). 
According to Lukács, Kant strove to solve this duality by logic; yet, “his theory of the 
synthetic function of consciousness in the creation of the domain of theory could not arrive at any 
philosophical solution to the question,” in the sense that Kant searched for the answer only in the 
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realm of metaphysics. That is to say, there is the fundamental duality inherent in the Kantian 
formulation that presumes the dichotomy of phenomenon and the thing-in-itself. Lukács was well 
acquainted with this philosophical dilemma as follows: 
It must be clearly understood that every contemplative stance and thus every kind of “pure 
thought” that must undertake the task of knowing an object outside itself raises the problem of 
subjectivity and objectivity. The object of thought (as something outside) becomes something alien 
to the subject. This raises the problem of whether thought corresponds to the object! 
Even with a cursory reading, it is clear that Lukács decisively presents the meaning of 
reflection in this quotation as correspondence, not using the term as in his later conceptualization of 
reflection. As Béla Királyfalvi argues, “in Lukács’s system the term ‘reflection’ is a constant 
reminder of the objectivity of art, but it definitely does not have a passive, mechanical meaning, 
with implications of copying, photography, or any kind of naturalistic technique” (p. 56). 
Seemingly, Lukács preserves his criticism of the Kantian concept of reflection even when he attacks 
naturalism as “mirror realism,” adapting Lenin’s reflection theory. Therefore, it must be stressed 
that Lukács depends on a different terminology in his defence of realism from his early theoretical 
articulation. Lukács regards Kant’s philosophical impasse as an inevitable consequence of the 
“theory” itself – while he defends the positive feature of Kant’s epistemology. In other words, 
Lukács does want to retain the optimistic factor of Kant’s philosophical question as to the 
relationship of subject and object, while minimizing a metaphysical aspect innate in Kant’s theory. 
The solution that Lukács alternatively prepares for Kant’s theoretical dead-end is to introduce the 
concept of totality. Even though many theoretical opponents harshly attack Lukács’s concept of 
totality, few properly present an alternative to the concept, much less an acceptable criticism of it. 
 
3. REALISM AGAINST STALINISM 
Despite the constructive aspect of Lukács’s aesthetics, it is interesting that most of his 
defenders even go so far as to regard Lukács’s realism as another version of a vulgar reflection 
theory. The conspiracy of silence around Lukács’s reflection theory, is suggested to arise from 
Lukács’s political career and his compromise with “official Marxism.” No doubt, this individual 
history leads to the prejudice that Lukács’s defence of realism is nothing less than a by-product of 
his politics. Even for Jameson, who has consistently endorsed Lukács, it is the uncomfortable truth 
that Lukács used a naïve reflection theory to privilege the position of realism over other 
representational modes. In a rather coy reference to reflection theory, Jameson situates this 
disturbing aspect of Lukács’s realism within the historical condition in which Lukács’s theory was 
constructed. After describing the dichotomy of base and superstructure which is commonly attacked 
as a vulgar Marxist theory by non-Marxists, Jameson defends this classical Marxist schema in the 
sense that it can be extended into allegorical interpretation. In his following discussion, Jameson 
states that “Lukács’s essay on realism may serve as a central example of the way in which the 
cultural text is taken as an essentially allegorical model of society as a whole” (p. 33). 
For Jameson, allegory is a rhetorical strategy produced under conditions where one cannot 
represent something, but, at the same time, one cannot represent something. To put it another way, 
the represented narrative is essentially allegorical in the sense that form is always less perfect than 
material reality itself. Jameson’s understanding of Lukács comes through an allegorical approach to 
realism. Jameson suggests the way in which “typification,” Lukács’s key concept in his 
conceptualization of realism, can be grasped as an allegorical method that allows us to read the 
mode of production in terms of an ultimately determining reality. In short, Jameson depends on 
allegorical interpretation in order to recuperate Lukács’s realism. He then reaches a resolution of 
criticisms of Lukács’s reflection theory by historicizing Lukács’s work. A direct consequence of 
this historicisation is the theoretical eclipse of the most political dimension of Lukács’s realism. 
The hidden impetus behind Lukács’s formulation of realism was his own intellectual demand 
to overcome the subjectivist tendency in History and Class Consciousness. 
The following quotation from “Preface to the New Edition” elucidates this transition undertaken by 
Lukács: 
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My intention, then, was to chart the correct and authentic class consciousness of the 
proletariat, distinguishing it from “public opinion surveys” (a term not yet in currency) and 
to confer upon it an indisputably practical objectivity. I was unable, however, to progress 
beyond the notion of an “imputed” [zugerechnet] class consciousness . . . . Hence, what I 
had intended subjectively, and what Lenin had arrived at as the result of an authentic 
Marxist analysis of a practical movement, was transformed in my account into a purely 
intellectual result and thus into something contemplative. In my presentation it would indeed 
be a miracle if this “imputed” consciousness could turn into revolutionary praxis. 
If we consider that Lukács wrote this “Preface” in 1967, we realize that this statement aims to 
valorize Lenin’s achievement. Lukács drew on Lenin as a symbolic authority in order to attack 
Stalinism’s legitimacy. When interpreting Lukács’s words, we become aware that his emphasis was 
not on Lenin as such but rather on a “practical” objectivity analyzed by Lenin. In this sense, what 
Lukács initially intended in his transformation from “pure class consciousness” to a reflection 
theory was rooted in his political and philosophical resolution that appears to be in opposition to his 
early theoretical trajectory. It is not difficult to see that Lukács’s way of accepting Lenin’s 
reflection theory is entirely different from the official Marxist model. Michael Löwy argues that 
Lukács’s book on Lenin is “in complete conformity with Leninist orthodoxy but, curiously enough, 
immediately enters into conflict with the official interpretation of Leninism in the Soviet Union, 
which is that of Stalin” (p. 18). 
In this respect, the original idea of Lukácsean realism has no relation to Stalinist dialectical 
materialism. Unlike Stalin’s socialist realism, Lukács’s model does not presuppose the transparency 
of reflection between consciousness and the natural law – “thinking” is not merely a by-product of 
the mechanical causality outside of human consciousness. According to Stalinist dialectical 
materialism, “thinking” is nothing less than a cognitive function whereby human consciousness 
simply obtains knowledge of the natural law. Describing the transitional moment in Lukács, Alex 
Callinicos states: 
It must be stressed, however, that History and Class Consciousness is a transitional work. 
The last two essays, “Critical Observations on Rosa Luxemburg’s Critique of the Russian 
Revolution,” and “Towards a Methodology of the Problem of Organization,” form a unity 
with Lukács’s little book, Lenin (1924). Together these texts represent a marked shift away 
from the messianism of his early Marxism, and an acceptance of Lenin’s “revolutionary 
Realpolitik.” 
It seems that this gives us a clue as to the reason why Lukács vehemently formulated a reflection 
theory, which seemed to be sharply contrasted to subjectivism. Our contention is that after History 
and Class Consciousness, when he began strategically following Lenin, Lukács’s aesthetic of 
realism was fundamentally opposed to the pseudo-socialist realism presented by Stalin. In this 
respect, Lukács’s realism can be seen as a form of anti-Stalinist code disguising its political 
meaning under the veil of aesthetics. From the mid-1930s onwards, Lukács launched critical sallies 
against the naturalism of writers such as Zola and Flaubert. Interestingly, Jameson indicates that “in 
Lukács’s work, ‘naturalism’ is a code word for ‘socialist realism.’ ”For Jameson, Lukács’s criticism 
of Zola is a strategy to disguise his attack on “what is publicly impossible to attack as such” (p. 
78).In this way, Jameson says that “Zola was not only a writer with certain political positions who 
might demand to be judged on their basis, or evaluated on their basis, but he was also the inventor 
of a mode of writing, naturalism, which was current in Lukács’s day and which Lukács indeed 
identified with socialist realism.” In Gelebtes Denken, Lukács himself briefly mentions his Leninist 
differentiation as “opposed to Stalin’s mechanical uniformity” (p. 165). This fragment clearly 
reveals the complicated political and aesthetic meaning of Lukácsean realism. 
 
Meanwhile, there is a broad consensus amongst Western intellectuals that Lukács’s realism is 
nothing less than an aesthetic collaboration with Stalinism. For example, David Pike attempts to 
stress the Stalinist aspect of Lukács’s realism, arguing that in the period of Soviet exile, 1933–1939, 
Lukács wittingly supported Stalin’s doctrine with his aesthetic writings. Pike claims that “Stalin’s 
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remarks at the seventeenth congress were significant for Lukács because he claimed the struggle for 
objectivity in art, which for him was pre-eminently a question of form, to be part of the battle 
‘against capitalist residues in the consciousness of the people.’ ”From this standpoint, Pike regards 
“Art and Objective Truth” as evidence that Lukács coupled his aesthetic idea to Stalinism. 
However, the way in which Pike criticizes Lukács’s realism is quite problematic. His assertion that 
Lukács’s realism is a by-product of Stalinism does not seriously consider the question as to how a 
political doctrine imposes on literary criticism. The problem lies in the way in which Pike 
reductively conflates Lukács’s political agenda with his aesthetic idea. Lukács’s formulation of 
realism is more complicated than what Pike describes. As Tom Rockmore acknowledges, “Lukács’s 
early interest in German neo-Kantianism influenced his entire later development, specifically 
including his aesthetic views.” Tihanov also claims that Lukács’s doctrine of realism "was shaped 
in the process of responding not only to Hegel’s concept of totality but also to the attempts of 
Lebensphilosophie to reconcile form and life" (p. 103).In this sense, a judgment that the principle of 
Lukácsean realism is nothing less than an aesthetic variant of Stalinism cannot be easily delivered. 
More problematically, Pike overlooks the fact that Lukács completed the book on Lenin, 
which shows the essential idea of his realism, in 1924. In this book, Lukács argues that Lenin’s 
assessment of reality is “far more a purely theoretical superiority in accessing the total process.”No 
doubt Lukács’s understanding of Lenin’s theory anticipates his later principle of realism: the 
realistic form of an artwork is superior to other aesthetic forms in its ability to access the total 
process of reality. Even though one can see a similarity between Lukácsean realism and Stalinism, 
it is difficult to consider it as an essential and fundamental reconciliation. 
Rather than Pike’s criticism, Rockmore’s analysis of the affinity between Lukács’s realism 
and so-called “official Marxism” might be better taken for granted. Rockmore points out an 
interesting aspect of Lukács’s formulation of realism: “the reflection theory of knowledge has no 
demonstrable source in Marx, the source of Lukács’s earlier critique of this view. Hence, in 
returning to the reflection theory which he had earlier criticized, Lukács now agrees with Marxism, 
even if necessary against Marx.”This logical syllogism discloses that Lukács’s realism is no more 
than symptomatic evidence of his alteration of Marx; Lukács’s formulation of Marxism is created 
by his theoretical reinvention emphasising the Hegelian aspect of Marx. As Tihanov indicates, 
“While an uncontested political affiliation was driving him towards a full embrace of Marx, a 
lasting sense of measure, historical continuity, and the unrestricted sway of reason was propelling 
him towards an appreciation of Hegel as the philosopher par excellence, whose thought, regardless 
of all delusions and limitations, posits the true scale and depth of Marxism” (p. 248). 
However, there is another issue raised by Lukács’s modification of Hegel. Analyzing Hegel’s 
conceptualization of the dialectic of labor in The Young Hegel, Lukács argues that Man becomes 
human only through work, only through the activity in which the independent laws governing 
objects become manifest, forcing men to acknowledge them i.e. to extend the organs of their own 
knowledge, if they would ward off destruction. 
According to Tihanov, this book, The Young Hegel, is Lukács’s doctoral dissertation 
submitted to the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences during Lukács’s second 
stay (1933–45) in Moscow. What is at stake here is that Lukács’s analysis of Hegel can be easily 
compatible with the Stalinist doctrine of dialectical materialism. For Stalinism, the process of labor 
is an objectified system legitimated by natural law. This seems to be easily followed by the 
notorious confusion between economic mechanism and natural law. Lukács’s discussion of Hegel 
seems to be insensitive to such a dangerous possibility. Not surprisingly, this is where Löwy raises 
issue with Lukács’s political harmonization with Stalin to solve the dilemma of “either ‘reconciling 
with reality’ by accepting the Stalinist Soviet Union or breaking with the communist movement.” 
 
4. The Politics of Lukácsean Realism 
For Lukács, there would be no choice except actually existing socialism, in the sense that his 
philosophical premise was grounded on a fundamental antagonism towards capitalism. This 
principle of his way of understanding the world system has frequently been considered the result of 
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Lukács’s dogmatic “evolutionism.” When he drew on Lenin’s reflection theory, Lukács 
presupposed that the evolution of the artwork necessarily reflects the material conditions of society. 
Lukács’s theory of reflection according to the traditional dualism of base and superstructure 
remained established until the early 1930s. Criticizing the Lukácsean exploration of a modernist 
work of art, for example, Perry Anderson says that “the basic error of Lukács’s optic here was its 
evolutionism.”According to Anderson, evolutionism means that “time . . . differs from one epoch to 
another, but within each epoch all sectors of social reality move in synchrony with each other, such 
that decline at one level must be reflected in descent at every other” (p. 33).  In the same way, 
Anderson uses evolutionism in his rumination on Lukács’s criticism of modernism. It goes without 
saying that Lukács’s understanding of “healthy art and sick art” can be criticized as the result of his 
evolutionism. This is the main point of Anderson’s argument in that Lukács’s attack on modernism 
is anachronistic. Anderson convincingly points out the problem of Lukácsean reflection theory, yet, 
at the same time, he fails to observe that Lukács’s sense of evolution metaphorically alludes to the 
utopian unity of subject and object in artistic reflections. To quote Lukács: 
When we consider mankind’s evolution through the ages, art is seen to be one of the most 
important vehicles for the production and reproduction and for the development and 
continuity of man’s consciousness and sense of identity. Because great and healthy art fixes 
those moments of our development – otherwise transitory – that point ahead and enhance 
man’s self-consciousness and are thus lasting and because perfected forms allow the re-
experiencing of these moments, great and healthy works of art remain an ever-renewing 
treasure for mankind (p. 109). 
What Lukács argues here implies that perfected forms are indicative of the utopian reconciliation 
between subject and object in narrative. That is to say, form must be grasped as the incarnation of 
an author’s utopian impulses towards totality. Contrary to Anderson’s argument, Callinicos 
maintains that the most important influence on Lukács, including other Hegelian Marxists such as 
Antonio Gramsci and Karl Korsch, was “the anti-naturalist revolt at the turn of the nineteenth 
century.” In short, a significant philosophical factor in Lukács was not evolutionist materialism in 
the sense of naturalism, but anti-empiricist materialism in the sense of Marxism. 
What Lukács essentially aimed to do throughout his works was nothing less than “the 
reinterpretation of historical materialism.”In a sense, the suspicious aspects of evolutionism are 
inevitably internalized in Lukács’s formulation, insofar as he endorses the orthodox dualism of base 
and superstructure. However, Lukács’s case was not similar to Christopher Caudwell’s vulgar 
dualism, precisely because from the outset Lukács’s involvement with Marxism was based on an 
anti-empiricist materialism. Lukács does not endorse the “empiricist ideology” but “experience” as 
such. 
Certainly, the way in which Lukács privileges experience is drawn from Hegel’s distinction 
between empiricism and experience. Regarding experience as “raw sensory material” distinguished 
from abstract philosophical thinking, Hegel believes that he can refute empiricism. In fact, Hegel’s 
differentiating of experience and the abstract is derived from Kant and Hume, who emphasize the 
indeterminacy of the relationship between experience and thought. This discrimination is implicit in 
the way in which Lukács defends realism in the sense that an author’s own experience is more 
important than his abstract idea. It is in this sense that Lukács considers realism as more aesthetic 
than naturalism and modernism. That is to say, what Lukács pursues through his arguments about 
realism is this sensuous material that is independent of abstract thinking in the Hegelian sense. 
Lukács inevitably drew on the orthodox concept of base and superstructure, as he did not yet 
have the appropriate narrative to manifest his idea of realism at that moment. In addition, the 
theoretical transition of Lukács’s realism was definitely witnessed after the mid-1930s. In the face 
of Stalinism, Lukács launched a disguised criticism of official Marxism through the epistemological 
category of realism. It is in this sense that Lukács’s realism must be considered as the aesthetic 
surface of apolitical contention aimed at correcting the Stalinist voluntarism. This is why Lukács 
precisely stressed objectivity in opposition to subjectivism. 
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In general, Lukács stresses the philosophical doctrine of realism: first, materiality outside our 
knowledge determines language. Second, the process of thought reflects the world as reality. Third, 
appearance hides a more fundamental reality which exists independently of thought. This is the 
essential philosophical guideline that Lukács observes in his argument for realism. Therefore, 
Lukács emphasizes narration rather than description in the sense that real entities are concealed by 
their visual appearance. In other words, Lukács’s realism is an attempt to make a hidden reality 
visible. For Lukács, visualization serves to suppress reality by means of an illusionary inversion in 
which subjectivity takes the place of objectivity. 
In Lukács’s sense, realism does not mean an imaginary correspondence, as in naturalism and 
symbolism, but a “self-containment” that intensively reflects everyday life in “proper proportion.” 
Self-containment is the way in which the form of an artwork reflects social reality, as in the case of 
synecdoche. Lukács states that “the totality of the work of art is rather intensive.” In other words, 
the form of the artwork is “the circumscribed and self-contained ordering of those factors which 
objectively are of decisive significance for the portion of life depicted, which determine its 
existence and motion, its specific quality and its place in the total life process.” 
Lukács’s definition of form as self-containment incisively reserves the possibility of the 
changeability of form in each historical moment – in Lukács’s terms, “history is the history of the 
unceasing overthrow of the objective forms that shape the life of man.”From this perspective, a 
specific artistic form is manifested by each particular historical epoch. Therefore, what Lukács 
called perfected forms designates a self-contained form in which the intensive totality of an artwork 
cognitively maps the social reality in proper proportion. 
As we have seen, Lukács’s realism was a detour to get the insight of an alternative socialist 
system in terms of aesthetic epistemology. For Lukács, aesthetics was always the reverse side of 
politics, so that his criticism of naturalism and modernism largely aimed to suggest the practical 
aesthetic criterion for socialist movements. In a sense, Lukács’s realism can be said to be a 
“symbolic act” to solve contradictions in actually existing socialism. That is to say, Lukács’s 
realism contains more politically significant implications than his opponents expect. Regarding his 
unflinching fidelity to the teleological aim of socialism, it can be argued that Lukács’s theoretical 
pursuit towards realism in the 1930s came through the failure of his political career. 
In 1928, Lukács drew up the “Blum Theses” for the Second Congress of the Hungarian 
Communist Party. As Michael Löwy points out, all that lies behind these draft Theses was “an 
application to Hungary of the right turn of the Comintern,” and, at the same time, “both a 
continuation of the line of the years 1924–7 and an augury of the Popular Front strategy of 1934–8.” 
According to Löwy, Lukács’s suggestions were too late and too early in the sense that “these 
Theses were to be the last echo of the right turn, coming as they did at the very beginning of the 
International’s new ‘left’ turn” (p. 29). This misfortune led Lukács to confront  hostile criticisms 
and consequently to write his “hypocritical” self-criticism. Lukács acknowledged this in the “New 
Preface” as follows: 
When I heard from a reliable source that Béla Kun was planning to expel me from the Party 
as a “Liquidator,” I gave up the struggle, as I was well aware of Kun’s prestige in the 
International, and I published a “selfcriticism.” I was indeed firmly convinced that I was in 
the right but I knew also – e.g. from the fate that had befallen Karl Korsch – that to be 
expelled from the Party meant that it would no longer be possible to participate actively in 
the struggle against Fascism. I wrote my self-criticism as an “entry ticket” to such activity 
as I neither could nor wished to continue to work in the Hungarian movement in the 
circumstances. 
Regardless of some polemical problems arising from these remarks, Lukács’s unconditional 
capitulation to his inner opponents was the consequence of his own circumstances. As Löwy 
explains, Lukács saw the situation as an “isolated phenomenon” and “temporary aberration.”As a 
result, we could consider Lukács’s Theses to be an incorrect anticipation, in the sense that the new 
turn, which would provide an opportunity for the Theses, would only come when “it was too late, 
after Hitler’s victory and the establishment of fascism in the heart of Europe.”This analysis would 
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be incomplete without mentioning another important element manifested in the “Blum Theses.” We 
need to realize that these Theses provide notable evidence for understanding Lukács’s theoretical 
turn from early pure class-consciousness theory into reflection theory. Löwy’s analysis is validated 
by linking Lukács’s political inefficiency of his reflection theory. As Löwy points out, “the ebbing 
of the revolutionary tide and the internal changes in the USSR after 1924” forced Lukács to feel 
disillusionment: Disoriented by the disappearance of the revolutionary upsurge, Lukács clung on to 
the only two pieces of “solid” evidence which seemed to him to remain: the USSR and traditional 
culture. Seeing that the new, transcendent synthesis had failed, he would at least attempt mediation, 
a compromise and an alliance between these two different worlds. 
For Lukács, this “reconciliation” of bourgeois-democratic culture and the socialist movement may 
appear to be more realistic than the utopian Messianism that his early hopes presupposed. Lukács 
confessed that Lenin’s intellectual personality, a “philosopher of praxis, a man who passionately 
transforms theory into practice, a man whose sharp attention is always focused on the nodal points 
where theory becomes practice, practice becomes theory,” forced him to revise the Messianic 
features of History and Class Consciousness. According to Lukács, this was the process in which he 
came closer to reality. From utopian Messianism to “Realpolitik,” Lukács attempted to develop a 
reflection theory derived from Lenin, not in an abstract philosophical sense, but in a practical sense. 
After the mid-1930s, Lukács intended to wrest realism from Stalinism. As Johan Vogt indicates, 
Lukács’s harsh criticism of authors such as Hugo and Zola “struck also the panegyrical Soviet 
novels of the Stalin period.”As has been discussed, in distinguishing Stalinism from Leninism, 
Lukács emphasized that Lenin’s policy was more “realistic” than Stalinism, in the sense that the 
Leninist method was nothing less than an attempt to present policy changes as “logical 
consequences and improvements of the previous line.” For Lukács, Lenin’s method was more 
suitable than Stalinism for reflecting the discontinuous reality of history. One of the reasons why 
Lukács emphasized the rupture between Lenin and Stalin was that Stalinism “presented all socialist 
history as a continuous and correct development.” Convincingly, this statement reveals a clue 
whereby we can approach Lukács’s reflection theory without any misleading prejudice. Once 
Lukács embraced this “discontinuity” of history, he would have had to correct his utopian 
Messianism which seemed to be the dominant feature of History and Class Consciousness. Lukács 
confessed to this transition to solve the problem of historical development as follows: 
In the twenties, Korsch, Gramsci and I tried in our different ways to come to grips with the 
problem of social necessity and the mechanistic interpretation of it that was the heritage of 
the Second International. We inherited this problem, but none of us – not even Gramsci, 
who was perhaps the best of us – solved it. We all went wrong, and today it would be quite 
mistaken to try and revive the works of those times as if they were valid now. In the West, 
there is a tendency to erect them into “classics of heresy,” but we have no need for that 
today. 
In these remarks, Lukács’s intention appears to be quite obvious. What he wanted to historicize was 
his early epoch, in which he tried to establish the system of knowledge of necessity in historical 
process. This aim of his theoretical work led him to pronounce “pure class consciousness” based on 
utopian Messianism. As Lukács himself confessed, this was where the problematic aspect of his 
early subjectivism came into being. Lukács did not agree with Western Marxism’s emphasis on his 
early work and the assessment that later Lukács is a digression from early Lukács. While this may 
have become the fate of Lukács’s reception in Western intellectual contexts, it has, to an extent, 
paradoxically betrayed him. 
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